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ABSTRACT Detecting and controlling the diffusion of infectious diseases such as COVID-19 is crucial
to managing epidemics. One common measure taken to contain or reduce diffusion is to detect infected
individuals and trace their prior contacts so as to then selectively isolate any individuals likely to have been
infected. These prior contacts can be traced using mobile devices such as smartphones or smartwatches,
which can continuously collect the location and contacts of their owners by using their embedded localisation
and communications technologies, such as GPS, Cellular networks, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth. This paper
evaluates the effectiveness of these technologies and determines the impact of contact tracing precision on
the spread and control of infectious diseases. To this end, we have created an epidemic model that we used to
evaluate the efficiency and cost (number of people quarantined) of themeasures to be taken, depending on the
smartphone contact tracing technologies used. Our results show that in order to be effective for the COVID-19
disease, the contact tracing technology must be precise, contacts must be traced quickly, and a significant
percentage of the population must use the smartphone contact tracing application. These strict requirements
make smartphone-based contact tracing rather ineffective at containing the spread of the infection during
the first outbreak of the virus. However, considering a second wave, where a portion of the population will
have gained immunity, or in combination with some other more lenient measures, smartphone-based contact
tracing could be extremely useful.
INDEX TERMS Mobile computing, opportunistic networking, epidemic models, social networks, digital
epidemiology.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent COVID-19 pandemic poses a major threat to our
society and way of life. To date, hundreds of thousands of
people have died, and millions infected. Most countries have
taken severe measures, such as quarantines, lockdowns and
social distancing, which continue to impact the population
dramatically. In addition, the impact on the world economy
is still hard to predict.
Countries and regions have tried tackling the COVID-19
outbreak in different ways to varying results. Countries such
as South Korea and Israel took action quickly just as the first
infectious cases appeared. They started checking anyone with
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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possible COVID-19 symptoms and, when a case of infection
was detected, their contacts were traced in order to detect
new cases. The use of mobility traces (mobile communication
and GPS positions) was instrumental to accomplishing this
task ([1]), and the epidemic was controlled without taking
further severe measures. Other countries, however, despite
taking some measures after the initial outbreak such as quar-
antining infected people or checking their direct contacts
only, did not manage to control the outbreak and eventually
had to take draconianmeasures, such as lockdowns and social
distancing.
Recent studies based on mathematical models have shown
that asymptomatic individuals have caused around 80% of
infections ([2]). Detecting COVID-19 is especially challeng-
ing because most infected individuals only have mild or
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even no symptoms. An important lesson can be learnt from
this experience: early detection and early response is key to
containing the initial outbreak. Therefore, fast and accurate
contact tracing is needed to aid in controlling epidemic dis-
eases. Contact tracing is a more selective isolation measure
targeting the subset of the population most likely to have the
infection, that is, individuals that have been in contact with
infected and detected individuals [3]. However, as has been
seen with COVID-19, if the average number of neighbours
and the basic reproductive rate are high, contact tracing has
to be far more efficient and rapid.
The widespread presence of mobile phones and increased
availability of data and computing power can provide a
ubiquitous way of tracking infectious diseases. This is a
new approach to dealing with epidemics, known as digital
epidemiology, which uses data generated outside the public
health system [4]. To be specific, smartphone contact tracing
entails using smartphones to collect the location and contact
details of their owners, so that when people do get infected,
their mobile can be used to trace their prior contacts so
as to locate anyone else who might have also potentially
been infected. These people could then be isolated (quar-
antined) themselves, thus limiting the spread of infection.
Recently, and with the urgent aim of dealing with COVID-19,
several contact tracing mobile Apps have appeared, such
as the Singapore Government’s TraceTogether [5], Europe’s
PEPP-PT [6], and MIT’s SafePath [7]. Lastly, Google and
Apple teamed up in April 2020 to develop and integrate into
their mobile operating systems what seems to be a defini-
tive solution for contact tracing and whose only potential
Achilles’ heel lies in issues of privacy.
The technology of these mobile apps is based on the results
of several years of research in Mobile Computing, and par-
ticularly Opportunistic Networking (OppNet). OppNet [8] is
based on the opportunity of exchanging messages between
nearby devices when some type of direct and localised com-
munication link is established (e.g., through a Bluetooth
or WiFi direct channel). In some way, their behaviour and
dynamics are similar to an epidemic spread of messages.
In fact, many of the models used to evaluate these networks
are an adaptation of well-known epidemic population mod-
els [9]. The study of mobility models and social behaviour
was also key to evaluating the spread of information [10].
We believe that all this research background can help in
coping with the spread of infectious diseases. In particular,
we have not only studied the dynamics of message spreading
and human mobility but have also developed several mathe-
matical models and simulations tools [11]–[14] in this field.
While the main goal of these previous research efforts was to
improve the spread of information, our primary goal now is
to reduce and halt the spread of infectious diseases.
In this paper, we focus on evaluating how smartphone con-
tact tracing impacts the control and spread of the COVID-19
disease.We first evaluate and compare several contact tracing
technologies and the relative methods for obtaining contacts.
We then use temporal network graphs to characterise both
the temporal contacts and the resolution and accuracy of
the different tracing technologies studied. On the basis of
these temporal graphs, we introduce a stochastic epidemic
model that considers the individual contacts and the trac-
ing technology. This stochastic model is later transformed
into a deterministic model using parameters obtained from
the stochastic models, thus allowing contact tracing to be
evaluated for large populations in a fast and accurate way.
On the basis of these models, we evaluate several possible
scenarios for smartphone-based contact tracing, including a
real mobility scenario based on real traces.
We believe this paper contributes significantly to a better
understanding of the potentials and pitfalls of mobile con-
tact tracing applications, particularly when applied to such
extreme scenarios as COVID-19. Some of the most important
outcomes are:
 Rapid contact tracing is extremely important for quickly
isolating potentially infected individuals, particularly for
a disease such as COVID-19, with a high reproduction
rate and low detection rate. This result is in agree-
ment with some recent results [15], [16], although our
methodology differs substantially from the one used in
these previous papers.
 Smartphone contact tracing precision mainly impacts
the number of quarantined persons, since it allows for
greater selectivity when quarantining citizens, thereby
reducing the personal inconveniences and economical
costs of these drastic measures. However, this accuracy
has no significant impact on reducing the final number
of infected individuals.
 Smartphone contact tracing, when adopted during a
first outbreak, can only be effective when a fast and
high-precision contact tracing technology is used, and
when a significant proportion (more than 80%) of the
population uses the smartphone application. These harsh
requirementsmake it unlikely to be a feasible solution on
its own.
 Fortunately, for future outbreaks, and under the condi-
tion that at least 20% of individuals gain immunisation
or that the reproductive rate gets reduced by some other
more lenient social distancing measures, smartphone
contact tracing can be very effective, even when only
a portion of the population is willing to use it (less
than 60%).
The outline of this paper is as follows: an overview of
related works is presented in Section 2. Section 3 introduces
the mobile tracing technologies and contact networks that are
used in the stochastic and deterministic models developed in
Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to evaluating these models
and their precision, and Section 6 evaluates the efficiency
of the quarantine measures and tracing technologies. Finally,
Section 7 details the main conclusions and future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Monitoring and controlling emerging infectious diseases is
vital to public health. Through the use of new technologies
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such as internet-based surveillance, infectious disease mod-
elling, remote sensing, telecommunications and mobile
phones, these infectious diseases can be predicted, prevented
and controlled [17]. This new approach for dealing with
epidemics is usually categorised with a newly coined term:
digital epidemiology [4].
Several works have evaluated the characterisation of
humanmobility patterns by usingCall Detail Records (CDRs)
for modelling and evaluating epidemic diseases [18]–[20].
Particularly, in [18], the authors explored the opportunity of
using proxies of individual mobility to describe commuting
flows and predict the diffusion of an influenza-like-illness
epidemic. However, depending on the human mobility data
source used, their predictive accuracy with regard to epidemic
invasion timing and propagation patterns differed.
Another method for detecting and tracing contacts uses
wireless sensor network technologies, such as Bluetooth or
ZigBee. One of the first experiments using MOTES was per-
formed by Salathé et al. [21]. They obtained high-resolution
data of interpersonal contacts on one typical day at an Ameri-
can high school, which made it possible to reconstruct the rel-
evant social network from an infectious disease transmission
perspective. The paper also includes an SEIR (Susceptible,
Exposed, Infectious, Recovered)model for evaluating disease
diffusion and the impact of measures such as vaccination.
Mastrandrea and Barrat [22] also used wearable sensors to
capture contacts between students and compared the results
with contacts obtained from personal diaries. Furthermore,
the authors compare how an epidemic disease was spread
using two different contact networks (from sensors and
diaries), which showed a notable difference in their dynamics.
Recent years have seen increasing interest in evaluating
the efficiency and impact of contact tracing in epidemics.
Contact tracing is a very useful measure focusing primarily
on potential next-generation cases. Contact tracing has been
proved to be a highly successful strategy when the number of
infectious cases is low, or at the early stages of an outbreak,
or especially when the disease may be asymptomatic (but
still infectious), as it provides the only means by which such
individuals can be easily identified [3]. Other studies evaluate
the main factor in making an outbreak controllable [23], [24].
There are two main approaches for modelling contact
tracing [25]: Population-based modelling is a top-down
approach depicting disease dynamics on a system level that is
typically used for analysing research matters from a macro-
scopic perspective; Agent-based modelling is a bottom-up
approach dealing with each individual as an agent, each with
their own movements and infection states, and is commonly
used to evaluate heterogeneous and adaptive behaviours.
In general, the latter method is more realistic, though it can be
computationally demanding. Some papers, such as [26], [27],
introduce a detailed stochastic model, which is reduced to a
deterministic approach for obtaining the most fundamental
dynamic of the epidemics and associated measures.
Most of these previous models only deal with generic
networks. However, in order to evaluate the precision of trace
contact models, we need to consider the network of contacts.
For example, Huerta and Tsimring [27] introduced a stochas-
tic model to evaluate the effect of contact tracing and random
tracing as a part of the epidemic control strategy in complex
networks. The paper shows that by tracing contacts, a major
outbreak can be significantly reduced or even eliminated at
low additional cost. This same stochastic model is also used
by Farrahi et al. [28]. In this paper, the authors evaluate how
communication traces can be obtained using mobile phones
to estimate physical contacts, and thus help in selectively
quarantining individuals. The results showed that contact
tracing is only efficient at the beginning of the outbreak due
to the rapidly increasing costs as the epidemic evolves. One
of the main drawbacks of the stochastic model used in these
two papers is its simplicity. For example, the model does not
consider the possible quarantine of non-infected individuals
or detected infected ones, as does the determinist model
introduced by Keeling and Rohani [29]. Another approach is
to model the spread of infectious diseases by considering the
dynamic of the nodes using a temporal graph, as introduced
by Yang et al. [30].
Some recent studies specifically deal with the COVID-19
pandemic. Ferretti et al. [15] claim that isolation and contact
tracing as currently practised is not preventing the COVID-19
epidemic; this is mostly due to the high number of asymp-
tomatic infected individuals that remain undetected, which
contributes to the spread. Thus, they propose using mobile
apps to trace the previous contacts, showing mathematically
that epidemics can be contained even when not all the pop-
ulation uses the application (although the required portion is
significantly high). Hellewell et al. [16] draw a similar con-
clusion through a simulated model. That is, in most scenarios,
highly effective contact tracing and case isolation are enough
to control a new outbreak of COVID-19 within 3 months,
even when only 79% of the contacts are traced. Nevertheless,
these conditions make smartphone-based contact tracing far
from being a realistic solution.
One of the first attempts at using mobile phones to esti-
mate contacts was the FluPhone application developed at
Cambridge University [31]. That application used Bluetooth
and other wireless signals as a proxy for estimating phys-
ical contacts and asked users to report flu-like symptoms
in order to evaluate the risk of infections. For COVID-19,
the Singapore Government developed and released the Trace-
Together mobile App for tracing, which also relied upon
Bluetooth contacts and had already been used to control
disease spread [5]. Other similar proposals, also focusing
on privacy issues, are the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving
Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) [6] and SafePaths [7], [32].
Finally, Google and Apple have teamed up to develop and
integrate similar solutions into the iOS andAndroid operating
systems. As they are integrated into the operating system,
the proposed solution is more efficient, andmore importantly,
will be ubiquitous for users.
Collecting personal mobility information, however, even
for health application purposes, poses specific challenges
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when it comes to upholding ethical principles and issues of
privacy [33]. Ultimately, the analysis of mobility data can be
justified if it can yield benefits to public health.
This paper differs in that it specifically evaluates how
smartphone contact tracing technology can reduce the spread
of infectious diseases and the associated cost of the quaran-
tine measures. To evaluate these contact tracing technologies,
it is necessary to consider contacts individually and on a
temporal basis. Additionally, as an example, we use a real
scenario to evaluate these contact tracing technologies.
III. CONTACT NETWORKS AND TRACING
In this section, we model contacts obtained via smartphones
by using contact network graphs. We first perform an eval-
uation of the different technologies that can be used to trace
the location of a mobile phone. Then, we describe a network
graph to model these contacts and how these previous con-
tacts can be estimated. Finally, using a real mobility trace
(NCCU trace), we describe how we obtained the different
graphs that will be used in the epidemic models.
Traditionally, these contact graphs were usually obtained
manually through personal interviews, during which the
patient tried to remember prior contacts or any locations
he/she had visited. This approach is widely used for some
kinds of diseases (particularly sexually transmitted ones)
where the contacts are clear and easy to remember. For most
infectious diseases, however, personal interviews provide
very poor tracing of prior contacts and locations.
A. MOBILE TRACING TECHNOLOGIES
Mobile contact tracing applications are based on the idea of
detecting contacts by using some of the latest localisation
and communication technologies. For this paper in particular,
we evaluate the ability of four different technologies to obtain
a network of contacts.1 From lower to higher resolution and
precision, we have:
1. Cell. The mobile phone network is distributed over
land areas called cells. Telecommunications providers
can determine the rough location of connected phones
depending on which cell the mobile phone is connected
to. However, the precision of the obtained location can
be very low since the area of any one cell can vary from
hundreds to thousands of meters, making the process of
determining contacts from these traces very inaccurate.
On the other hand, a great advantage of this technology
is that communication providers are already obtaining
and storing this information (legally, they are obliged to
do so in most countries), and so it could be used when
necessary (meeting, naturally the legal requirements).
Thus, the economic cost of using this technology can
1We have focused our study on widely available current communication
and localisation technologies that can be used for implementing real contact
tracing applications (such as those under development for the COVID-19
disease). Technologies requiring additional infrastructure and services (i.e.
BLE beacons) or those not supported by current mobile phones (such as LiFi
or UWB) are not considered.
be considered negligible when compared to other tech-
nologies.
2. Wi-Fi. Using local communication facilities, such as
WiFi, we can determine the identity (MAC Address) of
the surrounding devices. Thus, mobile nodes can peri-
odically scan and store information about all these sur-
rounding devices, which can also include the Received
Signal Strength (RSSI) for estimating distance.
3. GPS. Smartphones are equipped with GPS, which
allows them to be used to trace the user location. The
precision of this solution is about 10 to 15 meters
outdoors, although indoors the precision is severely
reduced, making this a significant restriction since most
infectious contact takes place indoors.
4. Bluetooth. Similar to Wi-Fi, although more precise.
For example, using Bluetooth we can obtain a trace of
the contacted devices with a resolution of 1-2 meters,
making it ideal for determining close personal contact,
which are themost likely to transmit infectious diseases.
Recent solutions usingWi-Fi and Bluetooth contact tracing
are based onmobile apps that exchange anonymous key codes
when a possible nearby contact is detected. This process
generates data with the possible user contact information that
must comply with each country’s regulations on data pro-
tection and privacy. This has led to two different models for
managing and storing these data: centralised and distributed.
In the centralised model, the anonymised data is uploaded
from the users’ mobile phone to centralised servers. This way,
the Health authorities can check and manage contacts. The
decentralised model, on the other hand, stores these contacts
locally and allow the users to voluntary check (or not) if
they have been in contact with people who may have been
infected. This approach is the one taken by the solution
developed by Apple and Google. Both models (centralised
and decentralised) can comply with most data protection
and privacy regulations, but the decentralised approach may
offer users a higher degree of privacy. However, the cen-
tralised model might provide Health authorities greater con-
trol and information about the spread of infections, and it
may be faster at detecting new potentially infected individuals
because it would not depend on the willingness of users to
check their status.
In both cases, these technologies would require deploy-
ment not only of the mobile App but also of the required
centralised servers to store and check the contacts, so the
economical cost might be significant.
B. CHARACTERISING CONTACTS
One common way of representing the interactions between
individuals is through the use of network graphs. These net-
works can be a very useful tool for understanding the trans-
mission of infections in human populations [29], [34] where
each individual is in contact with only a small proportion
of the population. We consider a population of N individ-
uals (the nodes) whose contacts are defined as a temporal
graph G(t), where a link between nodes i and j represents
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a contact between them at time t . In epidemic models, it is
very common to use a day as the time unit, so contact graphs
represent the contact between individuals in one day. That is,
Gij(t) is 1 if the pair (i, j) of individuals are in contact on
day t , and 0 otherwise. Usually, for infection applications,
this graph is symmetric (Gij(t) = Gji(t)), meaning that the
infection can be passed in both directions. The temporal
degreeKi(t) of an individual i is the number of links (contacts)
between this individual and the other individuals per unit time
(days). From this temporal degree, we can obtain the average














To evaluate the diffusion of the infection, it is useful to obtain






where Ij(t) is 1 if individual j at time t can infect others,
and 0 otherwise. Note, that Ij(t) does not consider infected
individuals that are isolated since they cannot transmit the
infection.
Using the contact network graph, we can also trace prior
contacts when an infected individual is detected, i.e. trace
back contacts in order to quarantine individuals who are more
likely to have the infection. In this case, we consider all the
contacts occurring in a given period 1 (the backward time
window). The idea is to trace back only recent contacts, and
this time window will depend on the dynamics of the disease
(for example, the incubation time). Summing up, we want to
check if an individual has had contact with at least one traced
individual during the previous backward time. We therefore
define a function Ci(t,1) that checks it, returning 1 if it is













where Dj(t) is 1 if individual j at time t is detected and being
traced, and 0 otherwise.
It is important to remember that the previous network graph
G(t) is the real contact network, that is, the one that reflects
the real physical contacts and, therefore, the transmission
of the disease. As when trying to model most real systems
however, it is almost impossible to obtain this real network.
For contact networks, in particular, it has been shown to be
impossible to obtain the real close-encounter interactions of
a population using wearable devices [35]. Therefore, by using
some of the previous tracing methods, we can only estimate
the real contact networks by obtaining a new graph Ĝ(t),
which is an estimation of the real one.2 In other words, they
are a noisy measure of the real network.
A method for measuring how noisy this estimation is was
introduced in [28]. We extend this method to consider tem-
poral networks. The method considers two main differences
between the estimated and real networks: (i) removed links,
when some of the real contacts may not have been captured
using mobile traces, and so some links from the real graph do
not appear in the estimated one; and (ii) added links, when
smartphone contact tracing apps generate some incorrect
contacts that do not occur in the real world, causing some
links to be added to the estimated graph that do not appear
in the real one. By making Lr (t) the number of removed
links at time t , and La(t) the added ones, and considering
that K (t) =
∑N
i=1 Ki(t) is the full number of links of the real
network graphG(t) (that is, the daily contacts), we can define





which ranges from 0 (both networks have the same links) to 1
(the networks differ completely, not sharing any links). If we








which will provide ameasure of the precision of the estimated
contact trace.
C. NCCU TRACE ANALYSIS
To evaluate the different mechanisms that go into obtaining a
network of contacts, we have used the NCCU Trace, a real-
life mobility trace obtained at the NCCU University cam-
pus [36]. This NCCU Trace was collected using an Android
app installed on the smartphones of 115 students attending
the National Chengchi University, Taiwan. The trace was
recorded over a period of 15 days and contains the GPS
data,Wi-Fi access points, and Bluetooth devices in proximity.
Time is specified with a resolution of one second, and the
position information is rounded to meters.
It is important to remember that, in most real experiments,
we cannot obtain the set of real physical contacts. Since we
want to evaluate the precision of the different technologies
(Mobile cells, GPS, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth), we consider that a
real contact susceptible to producing an infection is one that
is within the range of two meters and has a duration greater
than 1minute. Therefore, we processed theNCCU trace using
these parameters to obtain the G(t) contact network graph.
The result is a contact graph for 15 days with an average
rank of 7.66 (i.e. the average number of contacts per day and
individual). Figure 1 shows this contact graph for the first day
and includes the first 40 individuals. For some experiments,
15 days may not be enough time to evaluate the spread of
2This is similar to the dual graph model used in [28], although we prefer
here to use the dynamic system notation.
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FIGURE 1. Contact network graph for the first 40 nodes during the first
day. a) Real contacts; b) Bluetooth contacts.
an infection. Thus, when required, the trace will be extended
by repeating the previous weeks. It is assumed that mobility
patterns are very similar over consecutive weeks. This fact
is confirmed when analysing the contact time series, which
show high auto-correlation for the same weekdays.
Since our goal is to evaluate different technologies for
estimating contacts, we describe the different patterns and
methods used to obtain these contacts. Note that most contact
tracing applications only consider simple contact patterns, i.e.
a contact occurs if two mobile devices are within a given
distance for at least a predefined time. Thus, based on these
technologies, we generated several estimated contact graphs
Ĝ(t) as follows:
 Cell: The evaluated area of the campus is 3764 m ×
3420m, and we consider here a mobile cell network with
four towers and a resolution of 200 meters. Contacts are
obtained with this range in consideration.
 Wi-Fi: The range of Wi-Fi varies depending on whether
it is an open space or not. We consider a range of 25m
indoors, and 100m outdoors. Thus, for generating the
contacts, we evaluated whether the individuals are
indoors (or outdoors) by checking that the actual GPS
locations are inside (or not) a building area.
 GPS: In this case, we assume an outdoor accuracy
of 5 meters, which increases to 25 meters indoors.
 Bluetooth: In this case, we consider a direct detection
between mobile phones with a range of eight meters,
in both indoor and outdoor locations.
 Exact: This would be the desired goal, to obtain a contact
graph as close to the real physical contacts. It is included
in our experiments for comparison purposes.
In all cases, the minimal contact duration considered is one
minute. From top to bottom, the average rank of the above
list of estimated contact networks is as follows: {Cell 89.31,
Wi-Fi 69.18, GPS 41.00, Bluetooth 27.48, Exact 7.66},
clearly showing that the range used is decisive when estimat-
ing the number of contacts. With more detail, we can see the
Bluetooth contact graph in Figure 1b. When it is compared to
the real graph, we clearly observe an increase in the number of
edges (contacts) obtaining an error, as defined in Equation 5,
of 0.73. Figure 2 shows the temporal error between the two
graphs, with small variations between days (always in the
range [0.65, 0.75]. This figure also shows the average rank
per day, where we can see that the Bluetooth contacts are
FIGURE 2. Temporal error and rank of the real and Bluetooth contact
networks. The error is plotted against the right y-axis, and the average
rank against the left y-axis.
much higher than the real ones due to the higher range used
to detect contacts.
IV. EPIDEMIC MODEL FOR EVALUATING CONTACT
TRACING EFFICIENCY
In this section, we introduce our model for describing the
individual contacts and tracing mechanism. We consider a
SIR (Susceptible, Infected, Recovered) epidemic model with
quarantine in a fixed population of N individuals.3 We first
create a stochastic model using the event-driven approach and
considering each node independently. The contacts in this
model are driven by the real contact network defined byG(t)
and the estimated contact network Ĝ(t).
When considering an average number of contacts and
tracing intensity, this stochastic model can be trans-
formed into a deterministic model (that is, a mean-
field approximation), which results in an extended model
of the contact tracing quarantine model introduced by
Keeling and Rohani ([29], pp. 314-316). This continuous
model is useful for evaluating the dynamics of the epidemic
and the impact of the different quarantine methods in greater
populations.
A. THE STOCHASTIC MODEL
We consider a population of N individuals whose real tem-
poral contacts are determined by G(t). Individuals have six
states: S, susceptible individual (not infected); I , infected
individual; R, individual recovered from the infection; QI
infected individual that has been detected (or traced) and
therefore quarantined; QS , a susceptible individual that is
quarantined after being traced; andQT , an infected individual
that has been detected and is being traced.
The model has for each individual eight possible events
that imply a change of state that can occur at a defined rate.4
Formally speaking, the number of possible events is 8N , since
these events are for each individual. So, for example, an event
3As a closed system, no natural births and deaths are considered. We con-
sider that the time scale of the outbreak and the required tracing is small
enough to allow for not taking into account this variation on the population.
4In other notations, this rate is multiplied by a small 1t time interval in
order to obtain the associated probability of the event.
99088 VOLUME 8, 2020
E. Hernández-Orallo et al.: Evaluating How Smartphone Contact Tracing Technology Can Reduce the Spread of Infectious Diseases
TABLE 1. Events of the stochastic model.
from S → I for an individual will imply a change of state in
this node. As a reference of these events, see Table 1, and also
the notation in Table 2.
TABLE 2. Notation table.
The transmission rate, that is the rate at which the infection
is transmitted from an infected individual to a susceptible
one, can be obtained as the number of contacts at time t with
infected individualsK∗i (t), and the probability of transmitting
the disease, b. The latter value depends on the type of disease.
The infected individuals recover after 1/γ days, where γ is
the recovery rate. All these values are related to the basic
reproductive ratio as R0 = kb/γ , where k is the average
degree of all individuals (see equation 1). Thus, knowing
some basic parameters of the disease (R0, γ ) and the contact
network k , we can obtain b. R0 is one of the most important
figures in epidemiology and represents the expected number
of cases directly generated by a single case. Therefore, when
R0 > 1, the infection will start spreading in a population, but
not if R0 < 1. Generally speaking, the larger the value of
R0, the harder it is to control the epidemic. Finally, the most
common measure for the mortality rate is the Case Fatality
Ratio (CFR), which is the number of deaths divided by the
number of cases (infected). This value is not usually used in
SIR epidemicmodels since their behaviour is the same as that
of a recovered individual: they cannot infect other individuals.
In Table 3 we can see several estimated values of these values
for COVID-19.5
TABLE 3. Some estimated infectious diseases parameters (time unit
days). From [2], [15], [16].
In our model, we suppose that when an infected individual
is detected, he/she is immediately isolated. Then, his/her con-
tact network is evaluated in order to find any individuals with
a high probability of having been infected. These individuals
are also quarantining. We consider two quarantine strategies
in our model, namely the Infected-Detected Quarantine and
the Tracing Quarantine.
The first strategy, the Infected-Detected Quarantine is the
most common quarantine measure, where the infected and
detected individuals are isolated. In our model, infected indi-
viduals are detected, traced and quarantined with a rate δ
(event I → QT ), and stay in quarantine for an average
time of 1/τQ days. Before going into the final quarantine
state QI , these individuals stay for a short time 1/τT in state
QT , where their previous contacts are traced. The time 1/τT
can model, for example, how long it takes to trace the con-
tacts, allowing for a comparison of fast-tracingmethods using
mobiles phones versus traditional and slow-tracing methods.
After this time 1/τT , they change to the QI state, where they
stay more time, which is the remaining average quarantine
time: 1/τ ′T = 1/τQ − 1/τT . After that time, they recover and
change to the R state (event QI → R). Also note that as with
real epidemic spread, not all infected individuals are detected
(for example, those having no symptoms or mild symptoms),
and so they can still infect susceptible individuals. For those
infected and not detected, they recover from the disease with
a rate of γ (event I → R).
In the second quarantine strategy, the Tracing Quarantine,
when infected individuals are detected (that is, when they are
in state QT ), their prior contacts in the susceptible state are
5Note that these estimated values are drawn from very preliminary studies,
and also depend on the location and country.
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traced using the estimated contact network Ĝ(t), and some
of them are quarantined. Using Equation 3, an individual i
is a candidate for quarantine if Ĉi(t,1) is one, where Dj(t)
refers to the nodes that are in the QT state. However, not
all the traced individuals will be quarantined, so we define
q as the fraction of traced individuals being quarantined. For
example, this value can reflect the number of individuals that
use the mobile contact tracing app. In the case where the
tracing time is greater than 1, the q value must be normalised
by the average tracing time, as q′ = q/(1/τT ) = qτT in
order to distribute the tracing quarantine over the days. The
idea is that if the tracing time is long (for example, by using
interviews), it is precisely because it takes time to trace back
the prior contacts, so the whole number of traced individuals
during this tracing time is equally distributed over these days.
The rate at which all the susceptible individuals are traced
is q′Ĉi(t,1). Furthermore, a portion of these individuals
may have been infected during the period corresponding
to one time unit (that is, during the day). Thus, infected
people have a rate of q′Ĉi(t,1)bK∗i (t), changing also to
state QT , and consequently starting a new tracing. On the
other hand, non-infected people change to class QS with rate
q′Ĉi(t,1)(1 − bK∗i (t)). After being quarantined, individuals
in QS state go back to the susceptible state (event QS → S),
and individuals in QI state change to the recovered state
(event QI → R).
Finally, an alternative and more draconian measure can
be taken: a lockdown or full quarantine. That is, when the
outbreak starts, the entire population is forced to isolate in
their homes, and all public spaces are closed in order to
drastically reduce the number of contacts as a way of stopping
or slowing down the spread of the infection. This implies a
change in the contact network, where the number of contacts
is drastically reduced in order to reduce the reproductive
ratio (R0).
This event-driven stochasticmodel, as described in Table 1,
can be solved using the Gillispie method [37]. This iterative
method is based on estimating the time until the next event
occurs by using the cumulative rates of all possible events.
Considering N individuals and an initial number of infected
individuals (I (0) < N ), we set I (0) individuals in the Infected
state, R(0) individuals in the Recovered state,6 and the rest
in the Susceptible state. This procedure is repeated for a
given evaluation time T , or until the number of infected
individuals is 0. We consider that these individuals have a
physical contact network determined by graph G(t), and an
estimated one defined by Ĝ(t). These graphs are obtained on
a daily basis; thus, if we want to evaluate T days, we will have
T different graphs, and the event times need to be rounded to
a day.
To evaluate the efficiency of the different isolation meth-
ods, we also compute the accumulated number of individuals
6For evaluating a first outbreak, the value of R(0) will be 0. Nevertheless,
for possible subsequent outbreaks, part of the population may be considered
to have recovered and thus have immunisation, meaning that R(0) > 0.
quarantined using tracing methods (Qa). To account for the
individuals quarantined, Qa is initially set to zero, and it is
incremented by one whenever an individual is quarantined by
tracing (events S → QT and S → QI in Table 1). Note that
sometimes, if the duration of the infection is long, individuals
can be quarantined several times; that is, when they leave the
quarantine they return to the susceptible class so they can be
quarantined again.
The computational cost of this model depends on the num-
ber of individualsN and on the average degree k of the contact
networks. The performed experiments show that its compu-
tational cost is exponential with N . Therefore, we need an
alternative method when considering large populations, like
the deterministic model we introduce in the next subsection.
B. DETERMINISTIC MODEL
The stochastic model described above can be converted into
a deterministic model, assuming a degree of homogeneity
in the contact network. Thus, the precision of this model
will depend not only on the homogeneity of the contacts but
also on the number of nodes (individuals), where accuracy is
greater when the number of nodes is high. In this determinis-
ticmodel, the previously considered six states of an individual
are now transformed into six classes, which represent the
number of individuals in each state. Furthermore, to model
the transmission, we use the number of average contacts (k)
of the contact network.
To model the contact tracing methods, we use two different
fractions of quarantined contacts, one for infected nodes,
qi and another for susceptible ones, qs. The reason for having
these two fractions is to consider the effect that the real and
estimated contact networks have on the tracing of contacts.
The goal is to measure the precision of the technology used to
retrieve the infected individuals when tracing. If the estimated
contact network used for tracing has manymore contacts than
the real one (for example, when using the Cell one), it will
trace more susceptible nodes than a more accurate one.
The first value, qi is obtained from the stochastic model
as the average value of qĈi(t,1) for all i using the real
contact network as the estimated one (that is, considering
perfect contact tracing). To obtain this value qi, it is necessary
to perform several realisations of the stochastic model, for
example by using the Gillespie method. The second value,
qs is obtained in a similar way but using the estimated contact
network. In other words, the value qi determines the frac-
tion of contacts with infected individuals being traced and
potentially infected, and qs the equivalent for the ones not
infected.7 In general, we can see that qi ≤ qs ≤ q, since
the estimated contact network has more contacts than the
real one, and both of them refer to the whole set of infected
individuals, whereas q only refers to a subset of the infected
individuals being traced.
7Note the difference between q and qi, qd : q refers to the fraction of those
individuals who have had contact with infected individuals being traced,
whereas qi, qd refers to the fraction of those individuals who have recently
had contact with someone infected (not only someone traced).
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The transmission rate β, that is, the rate at which the
infection is transmitted from one infected individual to one
susceptible individual, is formed by the product of the number
of contacts per time unit k , and the probability of transmitting
the disease b; hence, newly infected individuals are generated
with a rate kbI SN . Regarding the tracing quarantine, the pre-
viously mentioned Ĉi(t,1) term will depend on the average
rank of the estimated graph, considering only the fraction q of
contacted individuals. Taking into account the rates in Table 1
as well, the equations of the continuous model are as follows:










I ′ = (1− qi)
kbIS
N
− δI − γ I





Q′I = τTQT − τ
′
QQI




In all equations, we have omitted the time in the classes
(e.g. for class S, S ′ = dS(t)/dt and S = S(t)). Also, note
that we have opted for not simplifying some expressions in
order to clearly differentiate the different transition terms.
A key issue in epidemic control is reducing the number
of infected individuals that remain undetected and who can
contribute to the fast spread of the infection (this fact has been
one of the main causes for the fast spread of COVID-19). This
can be achieved by increasing the detection ratio, for example
by increasing the number of tests, even for asymptomatic
individuals, and also by increasing the traced individuals.
From the previous model, we can obtain the conditions for
an outbreak to be controlled, that is, when I decreases. Thus,





< δ + γ (7)
This expression is similar to the one obtained by Keeling and
Rohani [29] (pp. 315-316). Considering that R0 = kb/γ ,
we can obtain the threshold for an epidemic outbreak depend-
ing on the basic reproductive ratio R0 and the proportion of
susceptible people (S/N ). Note that this expression depends
on qi and not on qd . This makes sense since only the detection
and quarantine of infected individuals can stop the spread of
the infection. This also means that less precise contact tracing
will increase the number of susceptible quarantined individu-
als. In other words, for the same number of traced quarantined
people, a less precise tracing will be less effective.
The set of Equations 6 do not have an analytical solu-
tion, so we have to use a numerical solution such as the
Euler method, or even more efficient algorithms such as the
built-in Matlab function ode45 used in this paper. Initially,
we assume a number of infected individuals I (0) and recov-
ered individuals R(0), meaning that S(0) = N − I (0)− R(0),
and the other classes are zero. Then, the model is solved for
a given time (one year, for example) or until the number of
infected individuals (the sum of classes I ,QI ,QT ) is less than
one. The latter means that the infection has finished and the
duration of the epidemic can be obtained as the time when
I (t)+ QT (i)+ QI (t) < 1.
As in the stochastic model, we can also obtain the accu-









Thus, Qa(t) is the total number of individuals quarantined by
tracing up to time t .
V. EVALUATION OF THE MODELS
This section evaluates the previous models, their precision
and applicability. It also shows the dynamics of the epidemic
when considering different quarantine measures.
A. COMPARISON OF STOCHASTIC AND DETERMINISTIC
MODELS
In order to use the deterministic model, it is necessary to
evaluate how the results of both the stochastic and determin-
istic models match. To evaluate both models, we used the
estimated COVID-19 parameters shown in Table 3. In the
following experiments, we evaluate the spread of the infection
using theNCCU trace, assuming an initial outbreak at day one
with five infected individuals (I (0) = 5), with no recovered
individuals (R(0) = 0), and the tracing timewas set to one day
(1/τT = 1), reflecting fast mobile tracing. For the estimated
contact network Ĝ(t), we used the one obtained using Blue-
tooth technology. For the stochastic model, we performed
30 realisations, selecting the initially infected individuals
for each realisation randomly. Using all these realisations,
we also obtained the averages of the main curves, i.e., the
number of Susceptible, Infected, and Recovered individuals.
From these realisations, we also obtained the value of k, qi, qs
to be used in the deterministic model.
The first experiment considers no tracing quarantine mea-
sures are taken, that is, when q = 0. Figure 3b shows the
number of individuals in the S, I and R states (classes).
Considering the average curves of the stochastic model (solid
lines), we can see that the number of infected individuals
initially increases, but after fifteen days (peak of infections)
the infection diminishes, and it ends around the eightieth day.
Figure 3b shows the number of individuals quarantined, so we
can see the peak of quarantined individuals takes place on
about day twenty-five. Regarding the differences between the
two models, we can see that, in general, the deterministic
model (dashed lines), when compared with the average of
the stochastic model (solid lines), slightly overestimates the
number of infections.
The second experiment considers a tracing quarantine
with q = 0.6. With this value, the estimated fractions of
traced contacts quarantined for the deterministic model are
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FIGURE 3. Dynamics of the COVID-19 epidemics in the NCCU trace. a) and
b) without tracing quarantine; c) and d) using tracing quarantine with
q = 0.6. Dotted lines are the results of 30 realisations using the stochastic
model; Solid lines are the average of these stochastic realisations, and
dashed lines are the results using the deterministic model.
qi = 0.052 and qs = 0.127. In this case, we can see
in Figure 3c that the number of infected individuals has
been reduced when compared to the no-tracing quarantine
results but at the cost of increasing the number of individuals
quarantined, as shown in Figure 3d. The duration of the
infection is slightly shorter, showing the effect of the quar-
antine. The most significant difference between the average
stochastic and deterministic curves is the traced susceptible
quarantined (QS ). The reason for this difference is that, in the
stochastic model, it is more likely for an individual being
traced to get infected (she/he has been in contact with an
infected person). This implies that transition S → QS is less
probable than in the deterministic model, in which all traced
nodes are evaluated homogeneously.
We repeated the previous experiments using other tracing
contact networks Ĝ(t) (that is, considering GPS, Wi-Fi and
Cell technologies for contact tracing) and the results were
quite similar. The effect of the tracingmechanism ismeasured
in the obtained values of qi and qs. These values not only
depend on q, but also on the detection rate δ (and, of course,
the contact network studied). Thus, to use the deterministic
model, we can estimate qi and qs for any given q and δ values.
Depending on these values, there is an upper limit range on
qi and qs, as shown in Figure 4. We can see that due to a lack
of precision for detecting true contacts, some technologies
can trace up to 60% of the susceptible individuals that have
been in contact with infected individuals, meaning most of
them would be false positives (individuals traced and quar-
antined, but not likely to have been infected). Additionally,
these results restrain the study of the deterministic model to
these limit values. Considering these issues, we can use the
deterministic model to evaluate large populations, which is
not computationally amenable using the stochastic model.
FIGURE 4. Estimated maximum values for the fraction of tracing
quarantine (qi , qd ) to use in the deterministic model depending on the
detection ratio δ.
B. EPIDEMIC DYNAMICS
In this subsection, we study the epidemic dynamics using the
deterministic model described by Equations 6 depending on
the different quarantine strategies. The idea is to provide a
better understanding of the dynamics of quarantining using
contact tracing. We again use the COVID-19 disease esti-
mated parameters shown in TABLE 3 with a population of
N = 1 million, and an initial number of infected individ-
uals set at 10 (I (0) = 10), with no immunised individuals
(R(0) = 0) and an average of eight contacts per day (k = 8).
We start by considering the case when no measures are
taken, that is, individuals are neither detected nor quarantined
(δ = qi = qs = 0). The results are shown in Figure 5a, which
clearly represents a typical simple SIR model where most
of the population gets infected due to the high reproductive
ratio (R0). In the second Figure 5b, we consider that some
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FIGURE 5. Epidemic Dynamics under different quarantine methods for the COVID-19 infection. a) No measures (δ = q = 0);
b) Detection and isolation of individuals. (δ = 0.05, qi = qs = 0) c) Increasing detection ratio (δ = 0.1, qi = qs = 0); d) Adding
tracing quarantine (δ = 0.05, qi = 0.05,qs = 0.13); f) Increasing tracing quarantine (δ = 0.05, qi = 0.08,qs = 0.25); g) Increasing
also the detection ratio (δ = 0.1, qi = 0.1,qs = 2.8).
of the infected individuals are detected and isolated (that is,
the detection rate is δ = 0.05). We can see that this simple
measure reduces the number of individuals that get infected,
although the duration of the infection is slightly increased due
to a small number of remaining infected individuals, which
slowly drops off after day 150. If we increase the detection
ratio to δ = 0.1, for example by increasing the number of
tests performed, the infected curve is flattened, as shown in
Figure 5c, significantly reducing the final number of infected
individuals. Flattening the curve of infected individuals also
implies that the duration of the infection increases.
Now, we evaluate the impact of the contact tracing quaran-
tine. Figure 5d shows the result for qi = 0.05, qs = 0.13 and
δ = 0.05. These values correspond to q = 0.6 in the stochas-
tic model. It can be observed that the number of infected
nodes is reduced when compared to the results in Figure 5b,
although the duration of the infection is increased. Note
also that, as expected, the number of quarantined individuals
(dashed lines) has also increased. If we increase qi, qs to the
maximum allowed for δ = 0.05, which is qi = 0.08, qs =
0.25, the infected population is notably reduced, as shown
in Figure 5e, and the quarantined individuals are also reduced.
Finally, Figure 5f shows the effect of increasing the detection
ratio to δ = 0.1 with qi = 0.1 and qi = 2.8. In this case,
the curve of those infected has been completely flattened,
and the number of infected individuals is also reduced. If we
increase these values, for example to qi = 0.1 and δ =
0.15, the result (not shown here since they are flat curves)
is a control of the outbreak, and the infection is not spread.
These threshold values can be obtained using Equation 7,
considering nearly all people to be susceptible S/N = 1.
We will study this issue in detail in the next section.
Summing up, the right selection of the detection rate along
with quarantine measures has a huge impact on controlling
the spread of the infection. In the next section, we will study
in detail the best combination of these measures.
VI. EFFICIENCY OF QUARANTINE MEASURES AND
TRACING TECHNOLOGIES
This section extends the previous experiments to determine
the effectiveness of each quarantine measure, and thus the
optimal strategy. It also evaluates the precision of the different
contact tracing technologies.
A. EFFICIENCY OF QUARANTINE MEASURES
First, we evaluate the threshold for controlling an outbreak
(that is, when the number of infected individuals decreases)
using Equation 7, depending on the proportion of susceptible
people S/N and the basic reproductive ratioR0. We evaluate a
first epidemic outbreak for not only when all individuals were
susceptible (S/N = 1), but also when some proportion of
the population has gained immunity after having recovered.
This fact is a key issue in controlling future and localised
waves of infection since some population will be immunised.
The results are shown in Figure 6. Note that only the values
delimited by the black lines correspond to the possible values
for the NCCU scenario.
The presented results are very significant, especially when
considering that COVID-19 has an estimated average detec-
tion rate of 0.05 and a reproductive ratio R0 close to 3.We can
see that, for the initial outbreak when S/N = 1, even using
efficient contact tracing, the disease cannot be controlled,
as unfortunately has happened. On the contrary, when some
fraction of people get immunised, outbreaks can be better
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FIGURE 6. Threshold for infection control for different ratios of
susceptible population. The pair of values above the dashed line results
in a disease-free equilibrium. The area delimited by the black line
corresponds to the possible values for the NCCU scenario.
controlled using smartphone contact tracing applications. For
example, for S/N = 0.8, we can obtain an outbreak control
for qi = 0.05 and δ = 0.085. Note that for the NCCU
scenario, a value of qi = 0.05 corresponds to approximately
q = 0.6, that is, the required fraction of people using the
contact tracing application. This means that the previous
requirement of having a significant fraction of people using
the contact tracing application is relaxed. We can also see
that, if S/N < 0.5, the quarantine will not be necessary as
the system will be close to herd immunity. Additionally, if we
consider the concurrent application of future measures like
relaxed social distancing (after the strict initial lockdowns),
which can reduce the reproductive ratio R0, we can also see
in Figure 6 that for δ = 0.04 with relatively small values of
qi (between 0.01 and 0.04), the outbreak can be controlled.
The consequence is that the required fraction of people that
must be using the application is reduced to values of between
0.2 to 0.4, making it a feasible solution.
We now evaluate the case of when the infection has not
been controlled, and thus many individuals get infected. This
evaluation is performed using the deterministic model, but
only showing the final results, that is, when the infection
is over. Again, the same COVID-19 disease parameters are
usedwith a population of 1million and considering Bluetooth
technology for tracing contacts. The infected and quarantine
values are expressed as a fraction of the population (i.e.
divided by N ). Figure 7a shows the fraction of the infected
population depending on the detection rate (δ), and the frac-
tion of traced contacts quarantined (qi). We can clearly see
how the infection is reduced when both the detection rate
and quarantine measures are considered. We can contrast
these results with the fraction of population quarantined,
as shown in Figure 7b, where for low values of detection rates,
the quarantined population can be very high.8 Using a less
precise tracing technology (GPS), we found that, as expected,
the fraction of quarantined people increases, as shown in 7c.
8We again point out that a fraction of quarantined population greater than
one means that individuals have been quarantined more than one time or for
longer periods than the quarantine time used in the model.
Finally, if we consider that part of the population is already
immunised, with R(0) = 0.2N , S(0) ≈ 0.8N , the fraction
of newly infected individuals is significantly reduced when
considering contact tracing, and additionally, the number of
quarantined people practically drops to half.
Summing up, for the first outbreaks of COVID-19,
smartphone-based contact tracing can only be effective when
using fast and high-precision contact tracing technology and
when considering that a significant proportion of the popu-
lation uses the application. It is also shown that the number
of people quarantined by contact tracing can be very high if
the detection rate is low, as it is for COVID-19. Fortunately,
for future outbreaks, and considering that at least 20% of
individuals could be immunised, or that the reproductive
ratio is reduced by some mild social distancing measures,
smartphone contact tracing applications can be very effective.
B. EFFICIENCY OF CONTACT TRACING TECHNOLOGY
In this subsection, we evaluate two aspects related to smart-
phone contact tracing technology: its speed and contact detec-
tion precision, and how it impacts the control and spread of
diseases.
One of the advantages of using smartphone-based contact
tracing is its speed. When detecting an infected individual,
tracing back his/her contacts is almost immediate. With tradi-
tional contact investigation it can take several days to obtain
these prior contacts. Therefore, we evaluated the impact of
this tracing time by increasing the value of 1/τT to 5 days, and
repeating the experiment of Figure 7a. The results are shown
in Figure 7f, evidencing a substantial increase in the fraction
of infected individuals, and confirming how important tracing
prior contacts is to having an effective quarantine.
We shall now study the efficiency of the different contact
tracing methodologies described in Section III. In previ-
ous experiments, we have shown that using a more precise
contact network has no impact on reducing the number of
infected individuals since this aspect mainly depends on the
value of qi. However, using imprecise contact networks can
increase the number of quarantined individuals, resulting in
a similar number of infected individuals. Thus, using a more
precise tracing technology will allow for greater selectivity
of individuals who are more likely to have been infected,
reducing the overall number of quarantined people.
To confirm this, we performed the following experiment
using the stochastic model and the NCCUmobility trace. The
idea was to obtain the accumulated number of quarantined
individuals (Qa) versus the final number of infected individu-
als. This way, we can compare the quarantine efforts required
for each contact tracing technology. The results are shown
in Figure 8a, which shows the average results of performing
500 stochastic realisations. We can clearly see that the more
precise the technology is, the fewer people that get quaran-
tined, with no increase in the number of infected individuals.
Using the values of qi and qs obtained from this experi-
ment, we can evaluate the effect of tracing technology over
a more extensive population using the deterministic model.
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FIGURE 7. Quarantine measure effectiveness: a) Fraction of population infected using Bluetooth-based tracing contact technology (R(0) = 0);
b) Fraction of population quarantined using Bluetooth-based tracing contact technology (R(0) = 0); c) Fraction of population quarantined using
GPS-based tracing contact technology (R(0) = 0); d) Fraction of population infected using Bluetooth-based tracing contact technology
(R(0) = 0.2N); e) Fraction of population quarantined using Bluetooth-based tracing contact technology (R(0) = 0.2N).
FIGURE 8. Evaluation of the contact tracing technology considering the final number of infected individual versus the required quarantine effort (Qa).
a) In the NCCU scenario using the Stochastic model; b) Using the deterministic model for R(0) = 0; c) Using the deterministic model for R(0) = 0.2N . Note
that, in this case, infected people corresponds to the newly infected (not considering the previous ones).
For this experiment, we again consider, as in Subsection V-B,
a population of N = 1 million, and an initial number of
infected individuals of 10 (I (0) = 10), with no immunised
individuals (R(0) = 0), and an average of eight contacts per
day (k = 8). The results are shown in Figure 8b, which give a
pattern similar to the results for the stochastic model. Finally,
we evaluate the case when there is a fraction R(0) = 0.2N of
the population already infected (that is, considering possible
new outbreaks at second waves). The results (see Figure 8c)
show that the number of quarantined citizens is reduced
and that the number of newly infected individuals can be
controlled with low quarantine efforts when highly accurate
tracing technologies such as Bluetooth are adopted.
Summing up, as expected, mobile contact tracing technol-
ogy exhibits a huge impact on the quarantine of individuals.
Firstly, it is absolutely vital for it to be fast. Second, it must
be precise when detecting real contacts.
VII. CONCLUSION
In general, accurate modelling and quantifying of human
mobility is critical to improving control of epidemics, but
it may be hindered by data incompleteness or unavailabil-
ity [18]. Furthermore, depending on the technology used,
we can obtain varying accuracy on the contact tracing.
In this paper, we focused on evaluating how smartphone
contact tracing technology can impact the control and spread
of infectious diseases. We have introduced a stochastic model
that gets transformed into a deterministic model, while taking
into consideration the effect of contact tracing and the quaran-
tine measures. On the basis of these models, we evaluated and
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compared several possible scenarios for smartphone-based
contact tracing. Although these models are generic for infec-
tious diseases, we have studied the case of COVID-19 in
particular.
With regard to contact tracing technology, our results show
that the mobile technology used for detecting contacts has a
great impact on the social and economic cost (measured as the
number of people quarantined). Accurate technologies, such
as Bluetooth, allow for greater selectivity when it comes to
quarantining people.
Furthermore, the results also show that in order to be effec-
tive (and particularly for the COVID-19 infection), mobile
contact tracing requires contacts be traced quickly and a
very high percentage of the population must use the contact
tracing App. Fortunately, our study also shows that for pos-
sible second waves of infection, mobile contact tracing can
be effective in controlling the disease, assuming that some
portion of the population will have gained immunity, or in
combination with some other lenient measures, such as social
distancing.
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